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INTRODUCTION 
The idea for the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
was first proposed by Lyndon Johnson in 1966 as one of several "bridge-building" 
initiatives between the United States and the Soviet bloc. The goal was to bring to-
gether researchers from different countries and disciplines to study problems com-
mon to advanced economies-pollution, health care delivery, traffic congestion, and 
the management of large enterprises in general. Formally nongovernmental, IIASA 
was founded in 1972 by twelve National Member Organizations (NMOs), with po-
litical and financial support from their national governments.2 
The purpose of this chapter is to offer lessons from IIASA that might be useful to 
future efforts at scientific cooperation across political divides. To that end, only 
those aspects of IIASA's history that I believe hold the most lessons for such efforts 
will be discussed. These include the origins of the idea in 1966, the negotiations 
leading to IIASA's formal founding in 1972, start-up issues in the 1970s, the with-
drawal of White House support in 1982, and three key developments in 1990-re-
newed White House support, the end of the Cold War, and a new research agenda for 
the Institute. 
I purposely tell the story in some detail so that others can also draw their own les-
sons. The creativity needed to move a negotiation through an apparent impasse often 
comes from creative analogies with success stories from other negotiations. The 
IIASA negotiations are a success story, and the more one knows the details, the more 
one can draw such useful imaginative analogies down the road. 
The paper provides an American perspective on IIASA's history, primarily be-
cause U.S. source documents were simply much more available than those from oth-
er countries. A complete and balanced history is still to be written. 
THE INITIATIVE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
IIASA's story begins with National Security Action Memorandum 345 (NSAM 
345). Issued on April 22, 1966, NSAM 345 addressed principally American nuclear 
planning, but it also laid out a policy that came to be called "bridge-building," of 
which IIASA was to be one small part. Bridge-building began with the logic of con-
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tainment, defined by George Kennan as a "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant 
containment of Russian expansive tendencies," which would eventually lead to "ei-
ther the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." 3 In the 1966 White 
House the argument appears to have been that bridge-building would either make the 
break-up safer or, what may have amounted to the same thing, speed the mellowing. 
Bridge-building came to encompass many initiatives, although not all were un-
dertaken solely to build bridges. Bridge-building included reducing export controls 
on East-West trade, extending Export-Import Bank credit guarantees covering East-
ern Europe, upgrading legations to full ambassadorships, establishing grounds for a 
non-proliferation treaty, easing Polish debt burdens, financing American exports for 
a Soviet-Italian FIAT auto plant, negotiating a civil air agreement with the Soviet 
Union, liberalizing U.S travel to Communist countries, and exchanging with the So-
viet Union cloud photographs taken from weather satellites.4 
In response to NSAM 345 an interagency group was convened to generate specif-
ic possibilities under the chairmanship of Dean Acheson, then a consultant to the 
Secretary of State. Its final report on June 3, 1966 covered the range listed above and 
included the following comments: 
An East-West Foundation or University might be established in one of the Eastern Eu-
ropean countries or Austria. The purpose would be to provide Western instruction in 
subjects of acute practical importance to the Eastern Europeans, e.g., agriculture, busi-
ness administration and modern management techniques. 
On June 15 President Johnson was due to address a delegation of visiting Austri-
an businessmen in the Rose Garden. Francis Bator, Deputy Special Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, suggested the occasion be used to propose 
new bridge-building initiatives, including "an East-West Institute of Management 
and Administration." Johnson's reaction was positive; Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk's was not. Rusk was concerned that such an initiative would undercut the U.S. 
policy of non-recognition of East Germany. He wished to consult first with Western 
allies through a discussion in the NATO Council and turn the idea into an interna-
tional Western proposal. Johnson chose postponement. If Rusk was deeply persuad-
ed that proposing an East-West Institute was not wise, Johnson would do the speech 
without bridge-building proposals . 
By July 8, there was another National Security Action Memorandum, NSAM 
352, and its subject was specifically "bridge-uilding." It began, 
The President has instructed that-in consultation with our allies-we actively develop 
areas of peaceful cooperation with the nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
He has asked the Secretary of State to examine and propose to him specific actions the 
Government might take. These actions will be designed to help create an environment 
in which peaceful settlement of the division of Germany and of Europe will become 
possible. 
NSAM 352 set in motion an effort culminating in President Johnson's October 7, 
1966 speech to the National Conference of Editorial Writers. In what became known 
as the "bridge-building speech," Johnson announced seven new initiatives and reaf-
firmed two already in train, but the list still did not include the East-West Institute. 
On November 30 Bator sent a memo to Johnson in which he recalled the history 
of the East-West proposal, Johnson's favorable reaction, the decision to hold off until 
NATO colleagues were consulted, and the absence of action since, concluding, 
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. .. if you are still favorably disposed, I recommend that we do a quick NATO check and 
go ahead with an announcement, perhaps next week . .. If you want him to take this on, 
Mac [Bundy] would be ready and willing . .. 
We would not want to nail down the specifics at the outset; it would offend both our 
friends and the Eastern Europeans. Bundy's job would be to conduct a real consulta-
tion, not a hard sell. However, those of us who have worked on the idea have in mind 
an institution based on the proposition that all advanced economies-capitalist, social-
ist, communist-share the problem of efficiently managing large programs and enter-
prises: factories and cities, subway systems and air traffic, hospitals and water 
pollu tion. There is great demand-in Russia and Yugoslavia as well as the UK and 
Germany-for the new techniques of management designed to cope with these prob-
lems. 
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Johnson approved, with instructions to clear it with Rusk, and then go ahead as 
proposed. Johnson himself would call McGeorge Bundy, who had earlier been 
Johnson's Special Assistant for International Security Affairs and was now the pres-
ident of the Ford Foundation. Bundy's appointment was made public on December 
15, 1966, but Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson alerted the Soviets prior to the an-
nouncement to improve the likelihood of a favorable reaction. 
EXP LORA TIO NS AND NEGOTIATIONS 
During the next few months Bundy met with U.S. and Western academics, busi-
ness leaders, Executive Branch officials, Congressmen, the Soviet Ambassador Ana-
toly Dobrynin, and ambassadors of various U.S. allies . By April 17, 1967 he was 
able to write to Bator in the White House that he believed it worth continuing the 
exploration. The Soviet government had extended an invitation to visit, and Bundy 
was prepared to go, presuming the White House approved of the direction of his ex-
plorations. His counterpart in the Soviet Union would be Jermen M. Gvishiani, Dep-
uty Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology and son-in-law of 
Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin . 
In May and June Bundy visited London, Moscow, Paris, Bonn, and Rome, togeth-
er with Eugene Staples of the Ford Foundation and, in Moscow, Carl Kaysen, Direc-
tor of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University. They found interest 
ranging "from considerable to great" in increasing international cooperation in the 
study of large common problems. But the written report of the trip, which at later 
stages Bundy circulated widely in the United States and overseas for comment, never 
once mentioned bridge-building or the original White House motivations. Instead, it 
described solid support for continued efforts based solely on the merits of the pro-
posed international cooperative research. 
Meanwhile, major developments were taking place between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. The two countries managed to exercise coordinated restraint 
during the Six-Day War in the Middle East (June 5-10, 1967), and in late June, at 
Glassboro, New Jersey, the first summit meeting between the countries in six years 
proved a notable success. By all accounts, Premier Kosygin and President Johnson 
developed a personal appreciation and understanding of each other that had eluded 
their predecessors. Although Johnson and Kosygin were at pains to emphasize their 
deep continuing differences particularly over Vietnam and the Middle East, the pop-
ular reaction in the United States was strikingly positive. Kosygin likened his recep-
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tion in Glassboro on the second day of the summit to a homecoming. Crowds of 
people lined the streets, some with signs reading "Welcome Back," "Peace, Tovar-
ich," and "Thank you, friend." More than 2,000 people waited through a muggy af-
ternoon and a heavy rain shower to cheer every phrase of impromptu post-meeting 
remarks offered by what the New York Times described as a "startled and obviously 
pleased" Kosygin. As the New York Times editorialized, 
If in the long run the talks ... help promote a lasting improvement in Soviet-American 
relations, much of the credit will belong to the people of Glassboro. The spontaneity 
with which they took Premier Kosygin to their hearts and the manifest genuineness of 
their interest in peace and international cooperation obviously had an infectious effect 
on the Russian visitors.5 
In August Bundy asked Bator for White House guidance on two issues: (l) 
Should it be made clear to the Soviets that the two Germanies could not be treated 
symmetrically? and (2) Were there White House objections to locating a center in 
London or Paris, rather than Vienna? Bundy's team had heard suggestions in Western 
capitals that Vienna and other neutral possibilities did not offer the needed range and 
concentration of intellectual resources. There were no White House objections, and 
for the next several years U.S. negotiators emphasized London and Paris as locations 
preferable to Vienna. The German question was more difficult, but in the end the an-
swer was also "no." It was better to avoid the German question for the moment than 
delay further discussions until U.S . positions had been thoroughly hashed out. The 
German question was anyway a moving target. West German policy clearly opposed 
full and equal participation of East Germany in international institutions, but in the 
summer of 1967 West Germany was beginning its own policy of bridge-building. 
Nor did the Soviets want to leap immediately to the German question . Kosygin 
had returned from Glassboro firmly impressed that Johnson was sincere in his vision 
for a more peaceful world and his interest in improving U.S.-Soviet relations. 
Johnson and he had even spoken briefly about the possible East-West center. None-
theless, a major point of Soviet policy was the status of East Germany. If Gvishiani 
could negotiate a deal that would raise East Germany's international status, it would 
be very attractive to the upper echelon of the Soviet government. Still, he too felt it 
wiser not to press for too much too soon. As Ambassador Thompson described to 
Bundy during a January 1968 conversation with Gvishiani " .. . [he] made clear that 
he was interested in finding a way to avoid this problem rather than to press for in-
clusion of the East Germans." 
In the fall of 1967 Bundy began a round of correspondence to convene a small 
international meeting of experts in the fields proposed for study at the East-West 
Center. Prime Minister Harold Wilson had placed responsibility for the British role 
in the hands of Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet. Bundy gently encouraged 
Trend to have the United Kingdom sponsor the small international meeting of ex-
perts, emphasizing to both Trend and Wilson that London might be the best place for 
the center to ultimately reside. The British did take the lead, and in February 1968, 
Sir Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Adviser to the Prime Minister, wrote to 
Bundy, Gvishiani, Pierre Masse (President of Electricite de France), Hans von Hep-
pe (State Secretary of the West German Ministry for Scientific Research), and Am-
bassador Caruso (Secretary General of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The 
University of Sussex had agreed to host an informal meeting of experts. Each of the 
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five countries, in addition to the United Kingdom, could send four participants. In-
dividuals would participate in their personal rather than representative capacities, 
and there would be no commitment by governments. 
Gvishiani immediately raised the German question. His own participation in the 
Sussex meeting, he suggested, might hinge on whether an "acceptable solution" 
could be found to the fact that Sussex had invited representation from West Germany 
but not from East Germany. Zuckerman hinted broadly that Gvishiani could include 
an East German on his own team if he chose, a possibility Zuckerman had already 
cleared with the West German Foreign Ministry. The meeting was to start on Satur-
day, June 16, 1968, but at the last moment, the Soviets cabled that they, the Poles, 
and the East Germans would not be attending due to the flare-up of tensions in Ber-
lin. 6 Nonetheless the meeting went ahead on June 16-20, 1968, with solid represen-
tation from West Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.7 The Soviet absence was a clear disappointment, but the argument that a cen-
ter would be valuable on its non-political substantive merits alone was by this time 
well developed and oft-repeated. No one with any diplomatic experience had expect-
ed completely smooth sailing given the difficult political issues to be addressed on 
both sides, and the possibility of creating a center without the Soviets, but leaving 
them the option of joining later had been previously raised. The Sussex conference 
concluded by forming a small planning group to be chaired by Zuckerman, which 
would address the following four points: (I) surveying current applications of sys-
tems analysis to civil problems; (2) considering commissioning pilot studies; (3) 
elaborating more specific proposals; and (4) considering a further meeting. 
A few weeks later, Gvishiani was sending clear signals of continuing interest. 
Within days of receiving a report on the Sussex meeting from Zuckerman he wrote 
to Bundy emphasizing Soviet interest.8 A week later he took advantage of a Paris 
meeting with Aurelio Peccei of Italy to reinforce the message and express specific 
interest in meeting with Bundy and Zuckerman in the fall, when he would next be 
outside the Soviet Union.9 East-West tension increased in August when the Soviet 
Union and its allies entered Czechoslovakia, but this had no evident effect on discus-
sions about the center. Indeed, Gvishiani met in Rome in October with Peccei and 
Zuckerman. His absence in Sussex, he explained, was because "The issue of East 
German participation, when it had become known that a West German team was 
turning up, had then been raised to an unnecessary level of importance ... " 10 Gvish-
iani assured Peccei and Zuckerman that Soviet interest was still considerable, and he 
stressed the particular Soviet interest in incorporating modern techniques of fore-
casting in their planning process. He emphasized the importance of focussing on 
methodology rather than political considerations. The less emphasis on politics, the 
less likely would be problems like those which kept the Soviets from Sussex. 
In the United States, the Sussex report was circulated to a number of distin-
guished academics. Their reactions were generally supportive, and Bundy's team 
would turn again to these academics as discussions progressed. Throughout, the 
team continued to expand the list of people to be consulted, possibly entrained in the 
planning, and, with luck and persistence, recruited to the center when all was said 
and done. 
Zuckerman, Bundy, Peccei, and Gvishiani met in Vienna on December 8, 1968, 
producing an aide memoire that was circulated to key Sussex participants. While fo-
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cussing on the substantive value of systems analysis research, it also dealt satisfac-
torily with Gvishiani's key concerns: "that the undertaking be non-governmental, 
that it be scientific in spirit, and that it should be open to others besides the initiating 
parties." 11 Peccei pushed for an early larger meeting to follow up Sussex. Zucker-
man and Bundy did not want to lose momentum, but did not want to gather too big 
a group prematurely. Moreover, Richard Nixon was to be inaugurated in January 
1969, and it would take time for the new administration to establish its position on 
President Johnson's initiative. 
Peccei was able to write to Gvishiani on December 20 that "competent people" 
in the Italian government approved and supported what had been discussed in Vien-
na. However, Peccei's main interest on December 20 was in another project he had 
discussed with Gvishiani "concerning the Problems of World Future." This was an 
initiative of the Club of Rome. Peccei pursued both in parallel, and while he was at 
pains to assure that what was to become IIASA not be confused with the Club of 
Rome, his efforts were not always enough for Zuckerman, who was unenthusiastic 
about the global modeling that came to be featured in Limits to Growth. 12 
In the United States, Bundy, assisted by Howard Raiffa and Joseph Bower of the 
Harvard Business School, convened groups of academics to refine aspects of their 
thinking and engage those they would eventually want involved in the center's work. 
To quite a few they gave questionnaires asking directly whether they would consider 
working at the center, what would be important considerations in their decisions, and 
how they ranked different possible locations. In the responses addressing location, 
Vienna was ranked very low. 13 
In July Bundy, Bower, Peccei, and Zuckerman traveled to Moscow for meetings 
with Gvishiani and others. Zuckerman's resulting aide memoire showed increased 
specificity. 14 There would be eight founding members (unnamed) and a structure 
built around four elements: a Council, a Conference to advise the Council, the Man-
agement, and Scientific Advisers. The aide memoire did not include a key oral agree-
ment that had been reached. The institute's Council Chairman would be from the 
Soviet Union, the Director from the United States, and the location in the United 
Kingdom. 15 At the suggestion of Gvishiani, the sole official language would be En-
glish.16 
They hoped to organize a meeting of founding members in mid-November in 
London, but the timetable slipped. In October Willy Brandt had been elected West 
Germany's first Social Democratic Chancellor, and time was needed to obtain final 
assurances from the new government about its participation and consent to East Ger-
man participation. In the United States, Bundy had discussed the IIASA initiative 
with Henry Kissinger and Lee DuBridge of the Nixon administration during the 
summer, 17 and in September Bundy and Raiffa reported on their efforts to the Na-
tional Science Board (NSB), the governing board of the National Science Founda-
tion (NSF). They proposed that the initiative should continue and that eventual U.S. 
participation in the institute should be managed by the National Academy of Scienc-
es (NAS) and financed by the NSF. The NSB concurred. 18 In October President Nix-
on designated the NSF the responsible agency for providing U.S. financial and 
administrative support and instructed NSF Director William McElroy to "seek finan-
cial support in the Foundation's budget for the 'International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis."'19 
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Under the new administration Philip Handler, President of the NAS, became the 
principal U.S. negotiator, and an NAS advisory committee was formed under the 
chairmanship of Kenneth Arrow. In May 1970 Handler visited Rome, Vienna, and 
Moscow. In Rome he met with Peccei and other Italians promoting Milan as a site 
for the center. In Vienna he met various Austrian officials advocating Viennese sites. 
In Moscow Gvishiani's team pressed for a Viennese site as well as for a Soviet Dep-
uty Director to balance the American Director. The Soviets had prepared three doc-
uments including a "Confidential Annex" for Handler's attention only. It hinted that 
the Soviets might require the center to be exempt from an existing U.S. embargo of 
computer exports to the Soviet Union as a condition for Soviet participation. It was 
a hint the Americans chose not to treat seriously and the Soviets chose not to pursue. 
At this point IIASA's founding was still more than two years away, but those in-
volved expected it to come sooner. The principal remaining differences were loca-
tion, the relative authority of the Council and Director, and the relative importance 
of methodological and applied research. The Soviets preferred Vienna for its prox-
imity, neutrality, low cost of living, other international organizations, cultural amen-
ities, infrequency of strikes, and the facilities and favorable tax treatment being 
offered by the Austrian government. 20 The Americans argued that Vienna lacked ap-
peal in terms of intellectual and research resources for the Westerners they would 
want to recruit. France, Italy, West Germany, and the United Kingdom each had of-
fers of their own on the table to host the institute. The Soviets wanted a relatively 
powerful Council21 ; the Americans wanted to assure the Director flexibility. The 
Western countries wanted all authority for hiring in the hands of the Director. Soviet 
and Eastern European proposals argued for national hiring quotas and giving nation-
al organizations a strong say in who would be recruited from their countries.22 The 
Soviets were hesitant about research moving beyond methodology. Westerners be-
lieved applications were essential if the institute was to be worthwhile.23 
There was agreement to be found in several areas. Both sides agreed on a four-
fifths majority voting rule to assure an effective veto to both East and West. Addi-
tionally, there was agreement on the financial formula : both the United States and 
Soviet Union would pay one-third, and the last third would be divided evenly among 
remaining members, for a total of U.S. $3 million.24•25 Finally, there remained the 
key understanding between the Americans and Soviets that the latter could select the 
Council Chairman while the former could select the Director.26 
The picture that was emerging was of a standing conference in which all partici-
pating countries could have one representative, some of whom also served on the 
Council. The conference was advisory, but the Council had real authority. It was im-
portant that the Council's size be limited; some seats would be permanent, and some 
would rotate. East-West balance was important.27 Underlying the variations dis-
cussed was a Soviet objective of administrative arrangements that would keep im-
portant decisions in the hands of the Americans and Russians.28 In some ways it 
looked like the UN, but it would retain its non-governmental label and membership, 
and it would be restricted, at least initially, to a small number of industrialized coun-
tries. 
Zuckerman was hoping for a general conference in the fall, but that proved im-
possible given the pace of talks. There was also tension between Zuckerman's initi-
atives in his role as the formal chairman of the planning effort, and Gvishiani's 
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interest in the United States and Soviet Union maintaining implicit control of the 
process.29 Zuckerman, Handler, Gvishiani, and Philippe Richer (Deputy Delegate-
General, General Delegation for Scientific and Technical Research, France) met in 
London on December 3, 1970.30 The meeting was considered "completely informal 
and unofficial," though all four participants confirmed for the record their explicit 
authority to negotiate on behalf of their governments. Gvishiani was clear on his ob-
jective-ironing out all details so there would be no points of disagreement when 
they convened a general conference to found the institute formally. Progress was def-
initely made toward finding formulations that struck the right balance first, between 
the Council's authority and the Director's, and second, between methodological and 
applied research. Agreement on a site was more problematic. They agreed only to 
form a small working group to collect information related to site-selection criteria. 
On June l, 1971, Handler met with Peccei and Gvishiani in Vienna, and flew to 
Paris to meet the next day with Pierre Aigrain and Philippe Richer. They discussed 
a draft charter Handler had sent Gvishiani in January, clarified terminological stum-
bling points, and generally reached apparent agreement on everything except the 
site . West Germany had now joined Gvishiani and the Easterners in backing Vienna. 
The group agreed that Zuckerman should convene a multinational preparatory meet-
ing in Paris in October. Gvishiani and Handler would revise the draft charter by cor-
respondence to assure an agreed-upon text prior to the October meeting. If they 
could not decide on a site then, a working group would be established to prepare for 
a definitive site decision at the subsequent "first meeting" of the institute itself. 
The planning meeting of "founding member institutions of eight nations" was 
convened in Paris by Zuckerman on October 11-12, 1971. 31 By this stage only Aus-
tria and France remained in the site competition. The meeting included presentations 
by representatives of the Austrian and French governments of their contending sites. 
The following day a smaller group inspected the French site at Fontainebleau. 
The draft charter was considered article by article . Effective agreement was 
reached on most issues: membership, status of member institutions, funding, and 
powers of the Director and the Council. On membership, Canada and Japan would 
be asked to become founding members. To maintain equal representation between 
East and West, Hungary and Bulgaria would be asked if Canada and Japan responded 
favorably. Only a simple majority would be required for Council decisions, but 
three-fourths of the founding members would be necessary, thus maintaining an ef-
fective veto for East and West. Disagreement remained first on the site-Paris or Vi-
enna. Second, major disagreement remained concerning the control national 
organizations could exert on appointments . Third, despite regular diplomatic expres-
sions of agreement, differences on the relative value of methodology and applica-
tions proved extremely hard to put to rest. Two working groups were formed-the 
first to forge agreement on a final charter, and the second to generate agreement on 
a site, or at least to develop objective appraisals if agreement proved impossible. The 
tentative date for launching the institute was set for February 28-29, 1972. 
The working groups met in Vienna in December 1971 and visited the Laxenburg 
site proposed by the Austrians. They met again in Paris at the end of January and the 
beginning of February 1972, and visited the proposed French site at Fontainebleau. 32 
By the end of February they had agreement on everything except the site and how to 
resol ve Soviet reservations about the process for approving research project leaders. 
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The French had rescinded their offer of Fontainebleau as cost estimates for renova-
tions kept climbing,33 and it was unclear what might be put forward as a French al-
temative.34 The founding meeting was pushed back first to March, then July, and 
finally October 1972. By March, however, Gvishiani and Handler were nearing 
agreement on Vienna as the site, although this was kept private to maintain bargain-
ing leverage and allow the French every opportunity to table a competitive offer.35 
By June 1972 Howard Raiffa had agreed to be the first Director and was visiting Eu-
ropean capitals reporting on progress, encouraging national committees, and recruit-
ing researchers. Academician Letov would be one of two Deputy Directors, and by 
August, Canada and Japan were prepared to have founding members included from 
their countries. A majority of the Site Working Group was recommending Laxen-
burg, a decision that was formalized in a divided vote on September 6 in London. 36 
First, funds from the Austrian government would make Laxenburg significantly less 
expensive than a French site. Second, to match Austria's offers of "special privileges 
and immunities" from taxes and customs the French would require a formal inter-
governmental agreement. Neither West Germany37 nor the United States38 would 
sign such an agreement given that there would be a founding member organization 
from East Germany.39 Their view was that any agreement signed by governments 
would violate the objective that the institute be nongovemmental.40 The Soviets 
dropped their reservations about research leader appointments, allowing these to be 
the unconstrained prerogative of the Director.41 The only quotas left in the Charter 
were provisions that two-thirds of research scholars must come from countries with 
member organizations and that "Each member institution shall have the right to have 
at least one research scholar selected from among its nominees ... "42 
IIASA's formal creation finally took place October 3-4, 1972 in the offices of the 
Royal Society in London.43 The NAS press release at the time noted briefly IIASA's 
genesis in the 1966 White House and subsequent support from President Nixon, but 
it dealt mainly with the value of joint research on systems analysis and never men-
tioned the original objective of building bridges.44 The New York Times was more 
direct: "Although officials here [Washington, DC] were reluctant to say so openly, 
privately they conceded that the institute was yet another step in a bridge-building 
effort that the United States hopes will eventually bring about the liberalization of 
the Soviet and East European Communist systems."45 
OBSERVATIONS 
From the U.S. perspective, the primary motivation behind the proposal for an 
East-West institute was bridge-building. From the very beginning the substantive fo-
cus was to be systems analysis and modern management techniques, fields where the 
United States led the world and where many believed great gains were to be had 
through improving and disseminating American methods. Bundy concluded early 
that the institute would have to be substantively first-class to succeed, and his team 
placed substantial effort into entraining top U.S. people from the outset. The Soviet 
Union had similar interests. Better understanding between East and West was a de-
sirable goal that would be well served by the proposed institute, and there were high 
expectations for new systems methods for analyzing and managing large complex 
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enterprises . The institute promised an attractive mechanism for looking jointly to the 
future beyond the distractions and dangers of day-to-day politics .46 Key individuals 
in both the United States and the Soviet Union believed that the United States had 
something to teach and the Soviet Union something to learn about systems methods 
applicable to large modem complex problems-and that it would be in the interests 
of all for the Soviets to learn from the Americans.47 
In both countries, the initial steps depended greatly on support from top political 
levels, particularly from President Johnson and Premier Kosygin. IIASA might have 
been founded even without the success of the 1967 Glassboro summit-the initiative 
was in train by then and Bundy had already visited Moscow-but it is clear that 
Glassboro helped greatly in the early stages. Later, assuring a high-quality program 
became the focus. The enthusiasm people around the world had for systems analysis, 
and the quality of people from the field who were involved were essential to the suc-
cess of the negotiations. Had the institute offered only a bridge between East and 
West, with no promise of exciting, high-quality, consequential research, it is highly 
unlikely it would ever have been founded. Despite historical assertions to the con-
trary, the converse is probably also true-that IIASA would never have been founded 
had it offered only good research without the appealing goal of improved East-West 
understanding. This point, however, appears far less often and less emphatically in 
the record. The conclusion is that the negotiations needed both high-level political 
backing and substantive research promise for their success. In the case of the IIASA 
negotiations, the former seemed to be especially important in the beginning, the lat-
ter in the end.48 
Another feature that appears to have been critical to the success of the negotia-
tions was the nongovernmental formulation . Both Gvishiani and Andrei Bykov (who 
assisted Gvishiani and became IIASA's first Secretary) report that after IIASA's 
founding, Chancellor Brandt mentioned to Prime Minister Wilson that he (Brandt) 
would have supported East Germany's participation in IIASA even if the Institute 
were intergovernmental rather than nongovernmental. This was an easier position to 
take by that time since the two Germanies were well on their way to formally recog-
nizing each other (which they did on December 21, 1972), but during the IIASA ne-
gotiations, this was by no means certain. Indeed, the German problem was central 
from the beginning of the IIASA talks; it prevented the Soviets from attending the 
1968 Sussex meeting, and it was handled successfully precisely through the early de-
cision to make the institute nongovernmental. In the Soviet Union the nongovern-
mental formulation also kept the initiative largely clear of the Foreign Ministry, 
thereby increasing Gvishiani's flexibility and ultimately reducing bureaucratic con-
straints on participation by first-rate Soviets.49 That the negotiators were always for-
mally acting only in their personal nongovernmental capacities (although with clear 
channels to their governments) also allowed them flexibility that no doubt helped 
greatly, and may have proved decisive. 
Balance between the research program's focus on methodology (the Soviet inter-
est) and applications (the Western interest) was essential to final agreement, as was 
balance in the control that could be exerted by Eastern and Western members. As-
surance that both blocs would retain an effective veto even as the institute expanded 
was critical, though nearly all Council decisions have since been made by consensus. 
The agreement to restrict IIASA to peaceful issues and avoid strategic topics was 
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reached so early that it is easy to take for granted. Nonetheless, it was undoubtedly 
essential. 
Johnson's objective had been a bridge between the United States and the Soviet 
bloc, but Bundy quickly made his consultations multilateral. First, it would be easier 
to build a high-prestige institute if it were not restricted to only Americans and Rus-
sians. Second, it would make for a more stable institution. As evidence, IIASA man-
aged to weather seven years in the 1980s without White House support, something 
that would have been much less likely had the United States and the Soviet Union 
been the only two members-nongovernmental or not. Multilateralism may have 
also added stability to the 1966-72 negotiations . 
THE FIRST DECADE 
Upon IIASA's establishment, Howard Raiffa was appointed to a three-year term 
as Director. Three-year appointments for the director have been the standard ever 
since. In 1975 Raiffa was succeeded by Roger Levien, who served two terms and was 
succeeded in 198 l by C.S. (Buzz) Holling. 
Raiffa faced the challenges of a start-up, while Levien 's subsequent task was to 
turn a successful start-up into a sustainable institution. Raiffa had enthusiastic sup-
porters, money, and an exciting and broad mandate. He had no building, no staff, no 
administrative support, limited international networks, and no history of trust and 
successful cooperation among the National Member Organizations (NMOs). By Le-
vien's arrival, IIASA had proved it could exist-it had acquired buildings, research-
ers and support staff, a library, and computers, and was establishing both the 
networks and mutual understanding to continue-but it had not proved it could last. 
Levien 's challenge was to expand IIASA's networks, mutual understanding, support-
ing constituencies, and its impact, while assuring the right balance between constan-
cy of purpose and responsiveness to growing, diverse constituencies. 
Recruiting 
Recruiting proved the Director's most important task. The U.S. team had been 
working on recruitment since the early decision that the institute must be of high 
quality. They had engaged top Americans in the planning, incorporated their advice, 
and cultivated potential recruits. They had negotiated the broad strokes of a research 
program that played to the enthusiasm they had heard for systems analysis applied 
to interesting international problems. They also recognized that for some people 
IIASA incorporated an important appealing, noble possibility of helping save the 
planet. Raiffa and Levien were always alert to sabbaticals and other special oppor-
tunities, but IIASA's main selling point was the promise of interesting research pos-
sibilities. Early on Raiffa recruited high-quality Westerners such as George Dantzig, 
Mike Fiering, Buzz Holling, and Tjalling Koopmans, with each initial success mak-
ing the next a bit easier. The Max Planck Gesellschaft recruited Wolf Hafele, who 
became the Western European Deputy Director and Leader of IIASA's Energy Sys-
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terns Program. Capable people were recruited from the United Kingdom's strong op-
erations research community, helped by the fact that IIASA's salary scale was higher 
than Britain's.50 
Beyond the research opportunities, IIASA held special attraction for Eastern pro-
fessionals. For internationally oriented individuals in the East, IIASA offered a win-
dow on the West. Moreover, living in Austria on a IIASA salary meant more money, 
more amenities, and more freedom professionally and personally. 51 It was appealing 
and successful as a place for "tunneling through ideologies," to borrow a phrase 
from Tibor Vasko, Czechoslovakia's signer of the original Charter.52 For example, it 
was at a 1983 IIASA conference that Soviet scholars first began publicly discussing 
the economic theories of N.D. Kondratieff, which had been condemned by Josef Sta-
lin in the 1930s. 
Raiffa was convinced that recruiting good Westerners for permanent positions at 
IIASA would be difficult. Moreover, permanent appointments of Westerners would 
have to be balanced by permanent appointments of Easterners . He had no way of 
judging which Eastern candidates would work out, particularly is this new field of 
systems analysis. His solution was fixed-term contracts for all researchers. The So-
viets pressed for a minimum term of two years. After disastrous results in several So-
viet cases, Gvishiani eventually agreed to a shorter minimum term. Fixed-term 
contracts for researchers have remained the norm at IIASA ever since. 
Raiffa was not given free rein to recruit from the Soviet Union, but struck the fol-
lowing compromise after about six months of intense debate. The Soviet NMO ex-
ercised the option allowed in the Charter of submitting lists of nominees whom 
IIASA could recruit; if none were acceptable to Raiffa, the Soviet NMO could 
choose to extend the list.53 By the end of Raiffa's term, however, Soviet recruiting 
was no longer from a restricted list, and with experience, Raiffa and Levien began to 
request specific individuals. The longer IIASA's list of alumni grew, the more routes 
there were for identifying and evaluating possible recruits. Understanding also 
spread that no country had an interest in sending unqualified people-they did not 
last and were ineffective in bringing home substantive intellectual research benefits. 
However, institute directors everywhere were still reluctant to relinquish their best 
people. To remedy this dilemma, Levien brought institute directors to visit IIASA to 
identify mutually beneficial collaboration and to see how IIASA could lead to more 
international exposure, invitations, travel, and further connections for their institutes. 
It was important to recruit younger researchers as well as established names. One 
early success of IIASA was the Ecology Project's work on spruce bud worm infesta-
tions in Eastern and Central North America.54 Buzz Holling, who led the project, 
emphasizes not only Raiffa's role in creating the right interdisciplinary mix and es-
sential opportunistic setting, but also the fact that he, George Dantzig, and others 
brought with them some of their best young students and colleagues. Their partici-
pation and their follow-through were essential to the project's success. 
In 1977 Levien started the Young Scientists Summer Program (YSSP). It has 
proved successful both as a mechanism for long-term recruiting and in its broader 
objective of exposing young researchers early in their careers to IIASA's internation-
al, interdisciplinary setting and research approaches. Its capacity has expanded from 
ten participants in 1977 to more than fifty today. It has received consistent praise 
from NM Os, outside reviewers, and participants. 
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Bureaucracy 
As might be expected in joint ventures between mutually suspicious countries, 
significant, and sometimes burdensome, bureaucracy was initially imposed on 
IIASA by both its Soviet and American parents. For example, every check Raiffa 
signed required Letov's counter-signature. With Letov often in Moscow, and Raiffa 
in Cambridge, the quick reactions needed for a start-up were difficult. With Bundy's 
help, Raiffa 's solution was a Director's discretionary fund financed by the Ford 
Foundation, which could be used for all Raiffa's start-up needs. Periodically he 
would request that the Council, if it concurred with his expenditures, replenish the 
discretionary fund with transfers from regular Institute funds. They always did. 
Against the recommendations of a number of his advisors, Raiffa also chose rel-
ative novices for administrative positions in the belief that they would introduce less 
bureaucracy than would seasoned international diplomats and administrators. He 
never regretted his choice. Publication policies also presented a potential pitfall, as 
Eastern bloc members and the Japanese initially insisted on prior approval of publi-
cations by NMOs. An elaborate-and most likely slow-approval procedure was 
avoided by an agreement that publ ications would simply carry a disclaimer describ-
ing them as the independent views of their authors. 
Relations with Other Orga11izatio11s 
Especially helpful were the consistent support Raiffa received from the Austrian 
government in navigating the bureaucracy, as well as assistance, temporary space, 
and temporary personnel provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). IAEA Director General Sigvard Eklund viewed IIASA as a potential attrac-
tive partner, and Raiffa was quick to explore joint appointments and other mecha-
nisms to mutually benefit the two institutions. UNIDO, another UN agency 
headquartered in Vienna, was more hesitant initially, perhaps because Director Gen-
eral Khene, an Algerian , was suspicious of this new exclusive East-West club. How-
ever, the WHO and UNEP proved surprisingly cordial and supporting. The directors 
of both were concerned about the quality of research within the politicized UN sys-
tem and they were interested in farming out contracts to IIASA's less politicized, 
higher-quality research staff. 
Levien expanded IIASA's list of collaborating institutions with three objectives: 
One was recruiting, which has already been discussed. The second was the role of 
such collaboration in spreading techniques of systems analysis. And third was the 
goal of building a diverse and extensive constituency. The more institutions to which 
IIASA could make itself useful, the better it could balance the diverse interests of its 
NM Os and their funding sources. 
In 1979 Levien, with the help of Gvishiani and T. Keith Glennan in the United 
States, created a program in International Cooperation in Systems Analysis Re-
search (ICSAR). U.S. corporations contributed tax-free funds to the NAS, which 
awarded them to industry-oriented IIASA initiatives supplementing the core re-
search program. The program increased awareness at IIASA of industrial interests 
and awareness among U.S. corporations of IIASA. ICSAR did not survive the 1982 
reversal in White House Policy toward IIASA, but U.S. membership did, in part be-
cause of continuing funds and support from a number of ICSAR corporations. 
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The Research Program 
In his initial tour of NMO-country capitals, Raiffa compiled a list of the projects 
suggested in each. Because none enjoyed universal support, he chose a portfolio of 
projects with something for everyone. Two key features addressed the prevailing 
doubts about researchers working together successfully on important problems with-
out government interference. First, there would be a methodological group, and, sec-
ond, the applied projects would address long-range rather than short-range 
problems. Long-range research was believed less likely to provoke government in-
terference, and if governments did interfere, IIASA could take at least temporary ref-
uge in methodological work. Projects would have finite lifetimes within the Institute, 
although each was encouraged to plan for continued decentralized research collabo-
ration after IIASA. 
A second major programmatic concern was the desire of East Europeans that 
IIASA serve as something of a consulting group, addressing their particular prob-
lems. Raiffa's compromise was that some such work would be undertaken by the In-
stitute as long as it also included a research component that advanced the state of the 
art. IIASA also had to deal with high expectations that global modelers had for the 
Institute. Peccei had been involved from the outset and had a clear interest in what 
IIASA might contribute along lines similar to those pursued by the Club of Rome. 
Solly Zuckerman had equally clear objections. The compromise reached allowed 
IIASA to host a series of conferences reviewing and documenting global modeling 
studies around the world, without working on global modeling directly. The global 
modelers liked the forum this provided. Their critics liked the requirement for doc-
umentation and the opportunity for skeptical review. 
Initially there was real reluctance to touch topics close to existing international 
negotiations. In 1974 Raiffa proposed to the Council a summer exercise-not even 
a project-related to the Law of the Sea negotiations. It would be an opportunity for 
scientists and others to mix informally and explore possible models relevant to issues 
in the negotiations, such as the economics of mining deep-sea manganese nodules. 
The Council rejected the proposal, believing it to be too involved with politics . In 
contrast, twenty years later the Council's strong support for research addressing in-
ternational negotiations on population and development, global warming, and other 
environmental issues was almost taken for granted. 
IIASA's initial years also provide some lessons in missed opportunities. For ex-
ample, many of IIASA's founders had envisioned an institute active in both research 
and training, and the Eastern Europeans in particular advocated that more attention 
be given to training. But the emphasis was clearly on research. Training got short 
shrift. It was a development Raiffa later regretted and listed high among things he 
would do differently if given a second chance. IIASA's one substantial training suc-
cess from its first decade has been the YSSP. 
Levien's task after 1975 was to turn the successful start-up into a sustainable in-
stitution. Levien came to IIASA from fourteen years at the RAND Corporation. On 
the basis of his RAND experience he established a matrix structure for the research 
program. There were four quasi-disciplinary research areas with two major cross-
cutting programs-the Energy Systems Program and the Food and Agriculture Pro-
gram. Research areas could recruit in their own fields, offer disciplinary appeal, and 
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have greater longevity than the cross-cutting programs. The cross-cutting programs 
emphasized interdisciplinary research and applications, and had shorter time frames. 
Relations with the NMOs 
All things considered, Raiffa and Levien were pleased with progress in Laxen-
burg, but less pleased with progress, or the lack thereof, in the National Member Or-
ganizations (NM Os) . From the perspective of the Director's office, an ideal NMO 
would have a strong substantive interest in IIASA's research, strong influence with 
its country's government and scientific community, and a stable, well-funded, and 
creative promotional program to extend both IIASA's impact in a country and the 
country's interest, awareness, and participation in IIASA. Raiffa had hoped each 
NMO would create a domestic mechanism through which IIASA's research could re-
verberate within its country. Some NMOs made more progress than others, but as a 
group they fell far short of Raiffa 's and Levien 's hopes. 
New NM Os joined IIASA from Austria (1973), Hungary (1974), Sweden (1976), 
Finland (1976), and the Netherlands ( 1977). Each NMO generally had another orga-
nization that provided its funds, often a finance ministry. The result (by 1977) was 
34 organizations with diverse interests that believed they had authority and respon-
sibility for the Institute. Finance ministries were frequently less concerned with sci-
entific progress than with domestic benefits that showed a return on their investment. 
Where NMOs were established organizations, their structures and interests were not 
always well suited to the field of applied systems analysis. For example, after Solly 
Zuckerman's tenure, the Royal Society offered little support for interdisciplinary, in-
ternational team-building around applied problems and criticized IIASA regularly 
for placing too little emphasis on publications in the disciplinary journals favored by 
Royal Society members. New NM Os were often no better suited than established or-
ganizations for supporting systems analysis at IIASA, and they tended to carry less 
clout within their countries' funding organizations and scientific communities. 
In retrospect, the creation of IIASA devoted little attention to the NM Os. Those 
negotiating IIASA's creation were each fulfilling the functions they would later leave 
to the NMOs. Each served as a two-way link, simultaneously doing three things: (1) 
promoting national interests to his IIASA colleagues; (2) negotiating compromises 
with mutual benefits; and (3) promoting IIASA to national constituencies back 
home. Finding or creating NMOs with the institutional capabilities and funding to 
carry on all three functions was difficult, and once the Institute's individual creators 
had left the scene, IIASA's Director and research leaders often had to shoulder the 
main burden for disseminating IIASA's results, raising additional funds, and build-
ing networks. 
Defections and Spying 
In some cases, such as Czechoslovakia, recruiting was difficult because govern-
ments feared that good researchers might defect to the West through IIASA. Indeed 
several Easterners did approach Raiffa about the possibility of defection, but were 
consistently discouraged. Defections would have likely stopped the Institute dead in 
its tracks. 
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Two features of IIASA were designed partly to make it a less attractive site for 
intelligence agencies to try to place their people. First, hiring was placed in the hands 
of the Director. This presumably made it more difficult for a spy to get hired at 
IIASA than at other agencies in Vienna where appointments were more controlled 
by governments. Second, IIASA did no confidential research so there was nothing 
secret to find at IIASA. Over the years, there were nonetheless several individuals 
from the West and the East who were suspected by their colleagues. To the conster-
nation of American officials, Raiffa chose to tolerate rather than confront the likely 
intelligence affiliations of people on his staff. Indeed he took IIASA's policy of non-
confidentiality one step further, maintaining no confidential Director's files and nev-
er locking his office. The intelligence responsibilities of suspected Soviets and East 
Europeans most likely were related more to watching their own nationals than to col-
lecting intelligence from the West. However, even alleged spying could have damag-
ing results when publicized. In 1981 the final issue of the former British newsweekly 
Now! published an article that Arkady Belozerov, a Soviet then serving as IIASA's 
Secretary responsible for external relations, was involved in espionage related to 
North Sea oil exploration. Belozerov denied the charges, but after discussions with 
Levien and citing the potential damage that even the allegations could cause to 
IIASA, he immediately resigned and returned to the Soviet Union. However, the in-
cident had reverberations across the Atlantic, where Ronald Reagan was now in the 
White House and policy toward the Soviet Union had shifted from bridge-building 
to isolation and pressure. 
POLICY CHANGES IN WASHINGTON 
In 1981 the Reagan Administration submitted a fiscal year 1982 budget proposal 
that halved funding for NSF's Division of International Programs. The Division, 
with the support of NSF Director John Slaughter, chose to eliminate funding for 
II ASA. Three reasons were given: other funding priorities (particularly bilateral pro-
grams), lack of Soviet reciprocity, and poor-quality research. 55 NAS President Philip 
Handler protested in letters to NSF Director Slaughter, Office of Management and 
Budget Director David Stockman, and Secretary of State Alexander Haig, and in tes-
timony to Congress.56 Several Western European governments urged the administra-
tion to reconsider, and several hundred U.S. scientists wrote to Slaughter and 
members of Congress. Congress restored IIASA funds for 1982, but the Administra-
tion promptly eliminated the funds again in its fiscal year 1983 budget proposal, add-
ing national security to the three earlier reasons. Again the debate moved to 
Congress, and again Congress disagreed with the administration on funding priori-
ties, reciprocity, and quality. On national security, however, it deferred to the Presi-
dent to make the final judgment, while observing that "it is not clear that all the 
evidence has been fully evaluated or that current facts support the hypothesis of a 
security concern at the Institute."57 In March 1982 Frank Press, the new President of 
the NAS wrote to the White House, noting that after reviewing classified documents, 
the NAS believed that it should continue in IIASA. On March 20 George Keyworth, 
Science Advisor to the President, wrote back. 
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We have . . . decided to reaffirm our complete withdrawal of support for IIASA. We be-
lieve that the scientific interests of the United States are more productively served by 
other international scientific programs. We continue to be concerned about lack of rec-
iprocity in IIASA's programs and about Soviet abuse of the Institute. We believe that 
it would be particularly inappropriate to continue our involvement in IIASA in light of 
other actions we have taken to show our displeasure about martial law in Poland and 
Soviet complicity in the oppression of the Polish people .. . I would suggest the Acad-
emy transmit its notice of withdrawal to the IIASA Council at an early date .58 
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Because IIASA was nongovernmental , the withdrawal of U.S. government sup-
port did not result in the withdrawal of U.S. membership . In fact, to assure continu-
ing U.S . involvement, an independent IIASA-U.S. Planning Group had been formed 
in December 1981. Its Chairman was Charles Maechling, Jr. of the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, and its Executive Director was Chester Cooper of Oak 
Ridge Associated Universities. Maechling had been legal Counsel to the NAS and 
deeply involved in the original IIASA negotiations from 1969-72. The Planning 
Group worked closely with IIASA's new Director, Buzz Holling, and included 
former IIASA Directors Raiffa and Levien, several other IIASA alumni, Keith Glen-
nan from the I CS AR Program, the Staff Director of the House Science and Technol-
ogy Committee's subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology, plus a 
number of members relatively new to IIASA but strongly supportive of its mission. 
The initial purpose of the Planning Group was to reverse the Administration's de-
cision to terminate funding. That focus changed in early April following George 
Keyworth's letter quoted above. Keyworth's letter led the NAS to notify IIASA for-
mally that it would withdraw at the end of 1982, and the Planning Group now turned 
to the task of finding or creating a new U.S. NMO and identifying the necessary pri-
vate funds . From both the NAS and the Administration the Planning Group had a 
promise of neutrality. They would neither oppose nor support the Planning Group's 
efforts, although the NAS Council resolution on withdrawal also expressed "the 
hope that participation of the U.S. scientific and technical community in the program 
of IIASA may continue to be possible."59 The IIASA Council, which in November 
1981 had indicated a willingness to be flexible during the U.S. crisis, had been kept 
informed of the Planning Group's activities . In April the Council met in emergency 
session to reaffirm continuing support for IIASA. At the regularly scheduled IIASA 
Council meeting in June, both Maechling and Cooper participated as did Bruce Han-
nay, still the formal U.S. Council member from the NAS. Maechling's and Cooper's 
presentation on their efforts was well received, and Hannay's own comments were 
generally supportive. While in Vienna, Maechling also briefed Austrian Chancellor 
Bruno Kreisky on the American efforts. 
Howard Raiffa meanwhile had approached the outgoing and incoming presidents 
of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Cambridge, Massachusetts, plus 
several other members of the American Academy's governing council. All had ex-
pressed significant interest. John Voss, the American Academy's Executive Officer, 
attended the Planning Group's June meeting, and the Academy's Council voted over 
the summer to take on the IIASA membership. The transfer of membership from the 
NAS to the American Academy was accomplished through parallel resolutions by 
the councils of the NAS, the American Academy, and IIASA, and became effective 
January 1, 1983. The Planning Group was disbanded. A new U.S. Committee for 
IIASA was established within the American Academy. Chaired by Harvey Brooks 
of Harvard University, it included most of the members of the original IIASA-U.S. 
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Planning Group. For 1983 the American Academy managed to raise $1.15 million, 
57 percent of its assessed dues. The Soviet NMO paid an amount equal to its 1982 
assessment of $1.92 million.60 
The withdrawal of U.S. government support had an effect on several other NM Os, 
although only one, the Royal Society, formally withdrew. As reasons, the Royal So-
ciety gave both the U.S. government withdrawal and a "lack of intellectual merit" in 
the research plan.61 Subsequently it recanted the latter reason, but it never resumed 
membership. The Fellowship of Engineering agreed to succeed the Royal Society as 
the U.K. NMO, provided it could secure funding, but it was unable to do so, and Brit-
ish membership ceased. French support began a long uneven decline, although it was 
not until 1993, after the U.S. government had renewed its support, that the Council 
voted unanimously to terminate French membership. The Soviet Union came very 
close to withdrawing in 1982. Maintaining support for IIASA had become more dif-
ficult since Kosygin's death in 1980, and there were strong arguments against Soviet 
payments in the absence of U.S . government payments. A high-level decision to 
withdraw was made, but Gvishiani brought together party secretaries to lobby Guri 
Marchuk, his new boss as Chair of the State Committee for Science and Technology. 
Marchuk was initially hesitant, but once persuaded, he then convinced Yuri Androp-
ov, then head of the KGB and soon to succeed Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982 
as general secretary of the Communist Party's Central Committee. 
In early 1984 the American Academy formally requested a renewal of govern-
ment support.62 In response Secretary of State George Shultz clarified U.S. policy to 
allow support for IIASA projects contingent on case-by-case reviews for consistency 
with U.S. policies on international scientific cooperation and national security.63 In 
1985 the American Academy turned to IIASA's Congressional supporters to include 
money for IIASA projects in NSF's budget. Funding was included for fiscal year 
1986. In October 1985 the American Academy submitted a voluminous research 
proposal to the NSF for $500,000 for six IIASA projects. A year and a half later, in 
March 1987, the National Security Council rejected the proposal, but subsequent 
proposals were more successfuI.64 Nevertheless, reviews took fourteen to fifteen 
months for each proposal because of national security clearance procedures required 
in addition to standard NSF peer reviews. 
These steps were seen as significant progress in the United States, but they still 
left the U.S. JIJMO far short of its formal obligations to the Institute . Its payments 
were too little, unpredictable, and targeted to specific projects. Other NMOs were 
envious. They too would have liked to pay less and target their favorite projects . For 
1987 the Council, prompted by Senator Michael Kirby of Canada, formally revised 
the contribution schedule to bring it into line with the reality that had developed. By 
that time, the U.S. NMO was paying about half of what it should, and most Eastern 
European NMOs had made proportional reductions in hard-currency payments. 
Overall the IIASA Council, led by the Soviet NMO, demonstrated remarkable 
flexibility and patience with the U.S. NMO during the Reagan administration. How-
ever, by the time George Bush succeeded Reagan in January 1989; both the Council 
and the American Academy were losing patience with Washington's reluctance to 
fund regular annual unrestricted U.S. contributions as called for in the IIASA Charter. 
McDONALD: BRIDGE-BUILDING ACROSS COLD WAR DIVIDE 73 
END OF THE COLD WAR 
In 1989, the first year of George Bush's presidency, three developments Jed to re-
newed White House support. The first was a White House initiative to establish three 
international centers for cooperative research on global climate change. The second 
was intensified lobbying by the American Academy's U.S. Committee for BASA 
and others, and the third was that security concerns in Washington diminished con-
siderably.65 
lntemational Global Change Research 
On November 6-7, 1989 more than 60 countries participated in a meeting in 
Noordwijk, the Netherlands on global climate change. All participants save the Unit-
ed States and Japan (and the Soviet Union by some accounts) supported explicit 
timetables and targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The United State-
sargued that too little was known about how to effect the proposed cuts and what the 
economic consequences might be. President Bush, who had spoken of a war against 
global warming in his campaign a year earlier, was criticized for his apparent retreat 
from campaign statements. 
The United States was represented by D. Allan Bromley, Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Science and Technology, and William Reilly, Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency. Bromley's subsequent report to Bush noted that nothing 
effective existed in the international domain to provide good information on how to 
effect cuts and estimate economic consequences. Bush's reply was simple-Bro-
mley should create something to fill the gap. 
A proposal soon emerged within the Administration to establish three regional 
centers for global climate change research. Thinking along these lines had already 
begun prior to Noordwijk, and the three regional centers would become a center-
piece of U.S. proposals made formally in April 1990 at an 18-nation White House 
conference on international global change research . North and South American 
countries would cooperate in one center. European and African countries would co-
operate in a second, and Pacific rim countries would cooperate in a third. Eventually 
"latitudinal" connections between the centers would complete a global network. For 
the European-African center, serious consideration was given from the beginning to 
modifying IIASA for this role rather than starting a new institution from scratch. 
One reason for this was that, by November 1989, IIASA's visibility had already been 
raised in the White House for other reasons. 
Intensified Lobbying 
Early in 1989 the U.S. Committee requested a high-level review of U.S. policy 
toward IIASA. The Committee believed the status quo was no longer tenable. 
Project-by-project funding was slow, cumbersome, uncertain, and inconsistent with 
IIASA's Charter and the commitments of all other members. After seven years of 
keeping the IIASA option alive for the U.S. government, the American Academy 
was finally ready to take "no" for an answer. If the government did not decide before 
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the end of the year to restore full dues support, the American Academy would give 
IIASA formal notice of its withdrawal. 
The request was sent from Harvey Brooks to Secretary of State James Baker in 
May. In August Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger wrote back that 
U.S. policy was unchanged so the U.S. Committee for IIASA focused on contacts 
within the State Department, OSTP, the National Security Council, and Congress. 
By the end of October the NSC had taken the lead in an inter-agency review, and in 
late November an initial inter-agency meeting concluded that no security reason now 
existed not to participate fully in IIASA. 
On December 28, Bromley called Brooks to say that President Bush had made 
clear his determination to take part in IIASA and to try to find money for the U.S. 
membership. U.S . government priorities for IIASA's research would be global 
change and economic restructuring in former centrally planned economies. The gov-
ernment would not fund straight "dues," but otherwise everything was negotiable. 
The NSF would be the lead agency as in the 1970s, with OSTP involvement at the 
policy level. Because paying dues was a key part of being a member of IIASA, 
Brooks could not report full success to the IIASA Council, but by May 1990 a suf-
ficient understanding had been worked out in Washington for Brooks to commit the 
American Academy to continuing membership. As Washington gained confidence 
that IIASA would develop a coherent research program centered on global change 
and economic restructuring, the American Academy gained confidence that the NSF 
would provide programmatic funding for the program as a whole . 
Important to this process of confidence building were, first, international progress 
on the three regional institutes for global change research; second, the increasing in-
volvement of Robert White, president of the National Academy of Engineering; and 
third, negotiation of a new strategic plan at IIASA. By the beginning of August, 
White had agreed to succeed Brooks as the Chair of the American Academy's U.S . 
Committee for IIASA. White was a Washingtonian in the midst of international glo-
bal change research and not considered part of the "Cambridge mafia" that had come 
to dominate the U.S. membership since its 1982 exile from Washington. White 
agreed to lead the U.S. membership only after personal assurances from Bromley 
that funding would not be a problem. White would also succeed Peter de Janosi as 
the U.S. member of the IIASA Council. And de Janosi, who had coordinated much 
of the U.S. lobbying effort for the past year, became Director of IIASA in August 
1990. He immediately started the process of negiotiating a new strategic plan cen-
tered on global change and economic restructuring. 
Diminished Security Concerns 
The extent of alleged Soviet misuse of IIASA and the threat IIASA contributed 
to U.S. security remain contentious to this day. Some contend that the classified 
record of Soviet misuse unambiguously justifies the lack of U.S. government support 
in the 1980s. Others describe the classified record as an embarrassment to U.S. in-
telligence services. It is not important to resolve the differences here. What matters 
are the opinions of those influencing key decisions at the time those decisions were 
made. In 1989 these were changing. As one government official noted early in the 
year, when IIASA previously had been cm a meeting agenda "fifty folks from DOD 
would show up to argue against it." That was no longer the case.66 
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One resason was the overall change in the perceived Soviet threat to the United 
States. By 1989, significant progress had been made in arms control negotiations, 
Soviet "new thinking" in foreign policy promoted better diplomatic relations, 
Mikhail Gorbachev's long-term commitment to perestroika was increasingly clear, 
and Western capitals were increasingly supportive. Moreover, sweeping changes 
were occurring in Eastern Europe: in June, Solidarity won overwhelmingly in Polish 
parliamentary elections, and on November 7, the East German government fell and 
the Berlin Wall was a historical relic within days. By the end of the year, Communist 
governments had also fallen or been radically purged in Czechoslovakia, Romania, 
and Bulgaria. By 1990 Gorbachev would be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his 
contribution to ending the Cold War. 
IIASA had also taken specific steps to respond to the United States security con-
cerns . During the 1980s, the Institute had reconfigured its international computer 
connections, and in 1989 the American Academy arranged a site visit to IIASA by 
two computer security experts from AT&T Bell Laboratories. In addition, U.S. ex-
port and re-export restrictions applicable to IIASA equipment were clarified, and 
new procedures were instituted at IIASA in response to Washington's concerns.67 
Reorie11tatio11 at llASA 
U.S. interests in IIASA as a global change institute matched welt with thinking 
in other NMO countries. With the end of the Cold War the first question for the 
IIASA Council was whether they should declare success, disband the Institute, and 
go home. If not, what would be the best direction for the Institute to take? All the 
NM Os concluded IIASA was a unique and valuable resource. Global change proved 
the best rubric under which to forge agreement on the Institute's future direction. 
There were differences of emphasis. Japan emphasized technological change; many 
former centrally planned countries emphasized economic change; the United States 
leaned toward environmental change and strengthening links to Africa. The mecha-
nism through which de Janosi and the Council reached agreement was the joint 
formulation of a new strategic plan for the Institute, Agenda for the Third Decade, 
formally adopted by the Council in June 1991. 
ASSESSMENT 
Bridge-Building 
IIASA began as one part of a bridge-building strategy in the Johnson administra-
tion. In this role it certainly succeeded.68 The principal evidence is that for 17 years 
during the Cold War, and for nine more since, Western and Eastern countries have 
worked together at IIASA, largely without government interference, producing good 
interdisciplinary work in areas including energy, agriculture, ecology, climate 
change, air pollution, population growth and aging, migration, economic change, 
methodology, water resources, transportation, and forestry. When IIASA was estab-
lished, it was hardly self-evident to IIASA's founders that Eastern and Western sci-
entists could work together productively on common problems. Could they get 
reasonable scientists with freedom to work seriously in the West? Could they create 
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something that would not crumble with the first political crisis between the United 
States and Soviet Union. The fact that the answer was "yes" was significant. 
Many examples of East-West collaboration are included in IIASA's history of re-
search teams and publications. An example that is interdisciplinary as well as inter-
national is that of James Vaupel, an American demographer, and Anatoli Yashin, a 
Russian mathematician. Although recruited to different projects, they met at IIASA 
in 1981 and began collaborating on modeling heterogeneous populations, that is, 
populations with diverse subpopulations. They wrote at least thirteen joint papers 
while at IIASA and continued to collaborate well after they left. Many other profes-
sional connections were begun at the Institute, plus quite a few true friendships (and 
even several marriages). Mutual understanding certainly increased between many of 
those from the East and West even in the midst of negative political stereotypes. Of 
course, there were those who, upon seeing the Soviet system in action, decided it was 
even worse than previously believed. Nevertheless, in terms of affecting formal pol-
icymaking, there is little evidence that the increased understanding gained by indi-
viduals at IIASA systematically made its way back into the policy process in any 
NMO-country. 
Research Quality 
Almost from the outset it was agreed that the Institute would have to succeed sci-
entifically if it was to succeed at all. Thus its second goal, essentially co-equal to 
bridge-building, has always been high-quality research. Its record includes strong 
successes, controversial successes, a host of good projects, and a fair share of disap-
pointments. Many formal reviews exist for the record-commissioned both by 
IIASA's Council and by various government agencies in several NMO countries. 
The NSF commissioned outside reviews of IIASA in 1976 and 1979 that included 
site visits by experts, peer reviews of IIASA publications, and surveys of U.S. alum-
ni and participants in IIASA conferences.69 The NSF has peer-reviewed all propos-
als for U.S. contributions since 1985. In 1993 the IIASA Council instituted a system 
of three external evaluation committees. Each committee is responsible for one-
third of the research program and visits are rotated so that each year one committee 
visits. All these reviews have found research projects to praise and projects that need 
strengthening or phasing out. The bottom line in all cases, however, has been further 
support for IIASA.70 
SUMMARY LESSONS 
With respect to its two original objectives-bridge-building and high-quality re-
search-IIASA was a success. Strong, high-level political support was essential, 
particularly in the early stages. Equally important was the involvement of high-qual-
ity researchers, first in shaping the Institute's future research agenda and then in its 
early research. Both the original negotiations and the eventual institute benefitted 
because they were nongovernmental. Multilateralism is credited with adding stabil-
ity, although IIASA may also have benefitted from the bipolar dominance of the 
United States and the Soviet Union: there was arguably greater political stability 
during the bipolar Cold War than in the multipolar periods before and since, and 
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IIASA is currently dealing with more diverse interests among its NMOs than during 
the Cold War. Additional important features in 1972 were balance in the research 
agenda among different national interests, balance between a U.S. Director and a So-
viet Council Chairman, and mutual vetoes for East and West. 
Future initiatives could improve on IIASA's experience by crafting stronger na-
tional support structures. Future efforts should also consider a greater emphasis on 
support from industry and philanthropists, and greater outreach efforts, including 
training and education as well as public relations. Finally, they should not underes-
timate the difficulties of expansion once the original enthusiasm and excitement 
have passed. 
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March 1979; "The Information Dissemination Program of IIASA in the United 
States," prepared by Nancy K. Roderer and Candace H. Olsen, King Research, Inc. 
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tute for Applied Systems Analysis," Kappa Systems, Inc., August 1978, NSF Con-
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70. Research accomplishments that have attracted particular praise include early work 
by Holling's Ecology Project on spruce budworm infestations in North America in 
particular, and on adaptive resource management in general. IIASA's Energy Sys-
tems Program, begun in 1973 after the first oil shock, was the Institute's major 
program throughout the 1970s. In the mid-1980s IIASA set the standard in estimat-
ing global warming impacts on international agriculture. In the 1990-; it has stayed 
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at the leading edge of this field, applying adaptations of IIASA's global agricul-
tural production, trade, and consumption models . In 1989, Stanislav Shatalin, a 
principal economic advisor to Gorbachev, encouraged IIASA to bring eastern and 
western economists and officials together to assess possibilities for Soviet eco-
nomic reform. The results were not adopted by Gorbachev to any significant 
extent. But, Boris Yeltsin later made greater use of them and, in November 1991, 
appointed Petr Aven from the IIASA project as Russia's minister of Foreign Eco-
nomic Relations. Since 1986 the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
has used RAINS (IIASA's Regional Acidification Information and Simulation 
model) as the key scientific support for negotiations under the 1979 Convention on 
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the main international accord regarding 
air pollution. In the field of natural resources and the environment, essentially 
every international science program in the past two decades has been influenced by 
the research and networks begun at IIASA in 1972. IIASA fostered in this area a 
new international community of interest at a time when nothing comparable was 
underway elsewhere. Ideas and connections begun at that time have persisted and 
expanded, and they now thoroughly permeate international efforts such as the 
International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme and the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change. See Ludwig, D.D. Jones, and C.S. Holling, "Qualitative Anal-
ysis of Insect Outbreak Systems: The Spruce Budworm and Forest," Journal Ani-
mal Ecology 44 (1978): 315-332; C .S . Holling, ed., Adaptive Environmental 
Assessment a11d Ma11age111e11t (Chichester, U.K.: John Wiley & Sons, 1978); Jeanne 
Anderer, Alan McDonald, and Neboj5a Nakicenovic, Energy in a Finite World: 
Paths to a Sustainable Future - Report by the Energy Systems Program Group of 
IIASA, volume I (Cambridge : Ballinger Publishing Company, 1981 ); Wolf Hafele, 
Energy i11 a Finite World: A Global Systems Analysis - Report by the Energy Sys-
tems Program Group of IIASA, volume 2 (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Com-
pany, 1981); Merton J. Peck and Thomas J . Richardson, eds., What is to be Done? 
Proposals for the Soviet Tra11sitio11 to the Market (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1991); Joseph Alcamo, Roderick Shaw, and Leen Hordijk, eds., The RAINS 
Model of Acidification: Science a11d Strategies i11 Europe (Boston, London, and 
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